The same models and assumptions that shackled the biological and medical disciplines one hundred years ago still trap the psychological disciplines today (Conant, 1952; Bertalanffy, 1967). The demand is urgent to conceptualize robust, theoretical frameworks that will guide, or perhaps, catapult the psychological disciplines out of their current schismatic gridlock. The schism perpetuated in the social sciences engages global theorists against radical empiricists. The global theorists are usually unconcerned with demonstrability of their generalizations, while the radical empiricists, riveted on their specific statistical results, disregard the nomothetic significance or implications of their own findings. Often, the net result to the social sciences is a severed half-truth from either the global theorist or the radical empirical side, and the two halves fail to make a cogent whole. This dissertation asserts that the underpinning issue of the scientific schism in the social sciences is more philosophically, rather than methodologically, driven. Most debates focus on the methodological diversities. These diversities have either deductive or inductive orientations to the road of knowledge, and as such, they are powerful considerations in the scientific process. Divergent epistemological orientations also have a substantive impact on scientific inquiry, because they reflect the scientist's ontological positions on the subject matter of interest. For example, if psychologists assume a deterministic position about human beings' behavior (the subject matter of interest), then their epistemological concern will be limited to causality. A theoretical framework purporting to bridge the methodological schism evident in the social sciences must, therefore, also express explicit and implicit ontological assumptions involved in explaining human behavior. Considerable historical evidence indicates that scientific progress is the exclusive outcome of neither the empirical nor the philosophical domains; rather, great progress in the scientific disciplines results when metaphysics and empiricism converge (Zukav, 1979). While the new theoretical framework must postulate metaphysical premises, the structural pattern must also move beyond the yokes of modern science's own history. From the earliest days of Bacon, Galileo and Newton, reductionism monopolized the perspective of the scientific community. The scientific task in reductionism is a two-part process. The first part is to reduce the phenomenon of interest, be it an event or physical matter, to the smallest performance component that can be isolated and observed. The second part is to examine the phenomenon for applicable causal terms and conditions. Reductionism eventually aggregates the results from all scientific inquiry into systematic, additive form, and describes phenomena in linear relationships, using the explanations that emerge, one phenomenon at a time. Reductionism necessarily implicates linearity because its concern is limited to causality. Even in the physical sciences, a reductionist perspective fails because the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts. Reductionism, though long criticized in the social sciences, still holds the psychological disciplines in its grip, notwithstanding exhortations to move beyond it (Koestler & Smythies, 1969). In addition to reductionism, contemporary psychology suffers from residual misconceptions and myths about the nature of science itself (Bickhard, 1992). Misconceptions such as operationism, restrictions to causal explanations, and experimentalism stem from the positivist influence eminent in behaviorism, and they are evident in current debates in the psychological community. The literature review in this dissertation covers the empirical and metaphysical convergence within the disciplines of physics and psychology. In physics, the review traces the empirical and metaphysical intersections of significance from Newton and Laplace to Planck and Prigogine. In psychology, the review considers historically important models of human behavior with their corresponding indicants and psychological theories (Torgerson, 1958). The review also includes the model or theory assumptions in either discipline that annotate issues applicable to human behavior. How are the two disciplines of physics and psychology connected? Both disciplines study the nature and workings of a matter of interest. Physics and psychology are related at the confluence of the observed with the observer, formalized by Heisenberg in the uncertainty principle elaborated in 1958. Arguably, when people study nature, nature is studying itself because people are part of nature. Additional relationships between psychology and physics have been suggested. The Swiss psychologist Carl Jung (1950) wrote that, as a psychological rule, inner contradictions that do not become conscious and resolved in an individual are ultimately expressed in external and divisive phenomena in the outside world. Wolfgang Pauli (1955), a Nobel Laureate physicist, responded to his friend Jung that from his perspective, psychological phenomena seem to affect the physical world in an identifiable, extraverted manner. Unlike the cultural polarity between physics and the humanities that Snow (1964) observed, today physics and psychology may join in dialogue because they both provide further understanding of human consciousness and behavior, offer reciprocal scientific challenges, and contribute to psychological modeling. Psychological models and theories seek to approximate the reality of human phenomena. They span from the deterministic to the phenomenologic. To be useful, models and theories must be: 1) substantively current, 2) integrative of historical findings, 3) open to challenge and 4) appropriate to research questions. Theoretical comparisons require an examination of the model/theory's assumptions and an analysis of the goodness of fit between the data and the model/theory when the model/theory reaches down to the data to meet its empirical constraint of testability. This dissertation seeks an applicable, theoretical framework that is better suited to the ontology, underlying system, and data of human behavior than the predominant psychological models/theories and debates currently offer. The debates of the last ten years toss psychology from attempted paradigm shifts to a pre-paradigmatic vortex. From diversity that appears to be disintegrating, however, psychology can emerge with renewed vitality (Kuhn, 1991) and move beyond concern about isolated paradigms to contextual interest in historical continuity and change in metaphysical assumptions (Bickhard, 1992). In Kuhn's (1970) sense, a paradigm denotes a construct broader in scope than a theory and more pervasive than a psychological mind-set. He refers to such a construct as a "disciplinary matrix." A paradigm is disciplinary because the various practitioner layers of a specific discipline hold the paradigm in common. A paradigm is also a matrix because it comprises numerous, ordered elements which require both supplemental interactional definitions and conditional specifications. The disciplinary matrix described in this dissertation does not conform to the Kuhnian definition. For Kuhn and others, a "discipline" conventionally treats a specified element or range of phenomena embedded in only one subject area. This dissertation emphasizes an interdisciplinary approach that cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries and their respective specializations. The inclusive perspective of reaching across disciplines is an effort to link and accommodate variables and dimensions that influence human behavior. The "matrix" aspect of this dissertation conforms to Kuhn's conventional definition, and reflects philosophical commitment to several fundamental elements: 1) a holistic ontology, 2) an integration of scientific knowledge currently available; 3) a basic unity of nature, and consequently, 4) an objective for scientific inquiry to address the human condition. These theoretical criteria foreshadow the notion that this dissertation is founded on a systems approach, rather than on a more traditional approach that analyzes segments of phenomena. Why a systems approach? At the most elemental level, the thrust for a systems approach comes from the inescapable and compelling reality of the complexity of human behavior. Additionally, the conscientious consideration of this human complexity requires a systems approach. The scientist-practitioner perspective of scholarship encourages awareness of empirical developments and theoretical explications in other disciplines that may apply to one's domain of interest. Thus, bridging to the physical sciences, this dissertation tests the applicability of chaos theory to psychology. This dissertation evaluates whether the properties of nonlinear dynamics, be these chaotic or nonchaotic, may either supplement or supplant current models of human behavior. As evidence of applicability and fit, this dissertation suggests and simulates possible applications of chaos theory, addresses the limitations of the applicability and fit of chaos theory, and outlines research questions that may benefit from theoretical extensions that include chaos theory. This dissertation will conclude by evaluating whether any of the predominant psychological models will accommodate chaos theory, and whether chaos theory--combined with one of these prevalent psychological models--reaches down and fits the data better than does the psychological model standing alone.